Combat games are formulated as zero-sum differential games with unilateral event constraints. An interior penalty function approach is employed to approximate optimal strategies f o r the players. The method is very attractive computationally and possesses suitable approximation and convergence properties.
Introduction
In a recent series of papers [ l l -[ 3 ] , a mathematical formulation of combat games was proposed. By combat is meant a dynamical encounter in n dimensional space>< = m n between two players, or opponents, u and v, both of whom have offensive capabilities and objectives. The state transition is governed by a set of n ordinary differential equations IJ and v are compact subsets. The initial time is t and the initial state is l i t , ) = xi.
. Associated with the players are target sets --Ja and .?,r in event space @ A .qa2 where 7, and 7,-are closed and there exj.sts a time --_ -Thus f. st* and it is the objective of each plaver to terminate the game in his own target set while avoiding that of his opponent. If a plaver achieves this goal he is said to win the game.
For each initial event the combat game can end with one of the following four outcomes: (a) We shall adopt the concepts of strategv, value and saddle-point as formulated in Friedman 141 with which the reader is assumed to be familiar. We shall say that a player's strategv is winning if it ensures him a win against all possible strategies of his opponent. Assuming that for a given event only one pl.ayer can win (say u), u's optimal strategy is determined so as to minimize over all his winning strategies the cost functional TZ TL His opporlent v chooses his optimal strategy s o as to maximize J. The resulting differential game is a zero-sum game with unilateral even; constraint (it ~ x .; 4 int ( 7"-> t/ t t' I T ? , ,tJ) that u endeavors to satisfy and v to violate.
It will be assumed throughout the paper that the initial event is in u's winning zone, i.e., that u is the winning player and hence u is the minimizer and v the maximizer of the cost functional.
We shall make the following assumptions about the functions f , 9 and h : denotes the absolute value, and let 
From the assumptions (A61 and (A8) it follows that for each point i t , x ) t JI: ,Ct,b,f)
-( i system in some x, neighborhood M of (t,x).
Therefore the differential system (1) such that O F to and all control functions u(t) and v(t).
Consider now any pair of control functions u(t) and v(t) for which the ? corresponding traject_ofy satisfies 0 5 7 St, in some subintervalit,t) of (.t,.f.*,\ such that for each c h c stithere exists a winning strategy 3 :.\ for u for which, given any strategyrof v, the corresponding trajectory satisfies the condition that p(k,~i) 3 E for all t,sttCt -.
In closing the present section Ee should like to emphasize that the existence of xd-saddle point strategies for the event constrained games does not imply that optimal feedback strategies exist. Indeed, the strategies computed via the Isaacs equation may be invalid on the boundary of the constraint set, a fact that can be illustrated by simple examples. To overcome the resulting difficulties we employ below a penaltyfunction approach that, for almost all ! t , x ) i n X u , yields arbitrarily close feedback approximations to the 7; -saddle point strategies for the plavers. instead of the cost functional of (3). It is readily noted that Theorem 2.1 remains true if (21) replaces (3) and, in fact, since d p is unbounded, the saddle point of the game with payoff (21) will always yield an interior trajectorv s o that the event constraint can be removed. Thus, we formulate for r the unconstrained differential game defined by (l), (21, and (21) and obtain the following: ircerior of u's wipning z o n e . Then the (unconstrai?e6> differential gave s~scciated v i t (l), ( 2 ) and (21) has value and an x, -saddle point as x 1 as optimal feedback strategies almost everywhere.
. Interior Penaltv Function Approach
Thus, for every positive number r the unconstrained "penaltv game" defined above has optimal feedback strategies almost everywhere that can be computed by emplcying the Hamilton-Jacobi necessarv conditions (Isaacs equation) for optimal-itv (or for that matter, any otier computational technique).
We shall show next that by suitable selection of the parameter r, arbitrarily close approximation of strategies for the original constrained differential game will be obtained.
First we note that with (21) replacing (31, the essential objectives of the two players are still maintained. In particular, the minimizer u wishes to prevent constraint violation and hence is penalized if the trajectory gets too close to the constraint boundary. The maximizer, u, on the other hand, wishes to cause constraint violation if he can, and hence his objective is enhanced by the incentive given him through the penalty term. 
--
The inequality (23) provides the essential justification for employing the proposed penaltv function approach for actual computation of optimal approximating strategies for the two players.
Concluding riemarks
We have developed an interior penaltv function approach for computation of (approximatelv) optimal strategies in (event constrained) combat games. Theorem 3.4 provides the theoretical justification for our approach.
It is interesting to make some qualitative observations.
In combat games, the winning plaver 'initiates' the combat. If he chooses the saddle point strategy ".'
(of the constrained game) thec for every strategv 1' of h i s opponent, s o t h a t h i s o p p o n e n t h a s n o i n c e n t i v e t o d e v i a t e f r o m t h e s t r a t e g y 2* . I f , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , u d e c i d e s t o p l a y a n o p t i m a l p e n a l t y s t r a t e g y t5: (for any fixed chosen rk ) , t h e n i t i s t r u e t h a t b u t i t may s t i l l b e t r u e t h a t s a r r i f i c e i n t e r m s o f c o s t ( o f t h e o r i g i n a l game) i n f a v o r of " s e c u r i t y " , The i n e q u a l i t y (23) however bounds t h i s c o n c e i v a b l e s a c r i f i c e t o w i t h i n a r b i t r a r i l y s m a l l limits s p e c i f i a b l e by t h e winning player u.
